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What is mimetic desire? 
 
Paisley Livingston 
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H3A 2T6 
 
Abstract 
This essay provides a conceptual analysis and reconstruction of the notion of mimetic desire, first proposed in 
Girard (1961). The basic idea behind the idea of mimetic desire is that imitation can play a key role in human 
motivational processes. Yet mimetic desire is distinguished from related notions such as social modelling and 
imitation. In episodes of mimetic desire, the process in which the imitative agent's desires are formed is oriented 
by a particular species of belief about the model or mediator whose desire is copied. These 'tutelary beliefs' 
essential to mimetic desire are distinguished from the 'thin' and purely instrumental beliefs about the model 
central to Bandura's (1986) social cognitive theory and similar models of observational learning. The problem 
of the identity of the objects of desire in episodes of social modelling motivates a distinction between internal 
and external forms of interpersonal mediation. Girard's claims about cognitive constraints associated with 
mimetic desire are examined, and scenarios of reciprocal mimetic modelling am analysed. 
 
 
Introduction 
The term 'mimetic desire' was coined by Rene Girard (1961), who makes a number of strong claims 
about the 'mechanisms' of interpersonal and social dynamics. The present essay neither elucidates 
nor defends all of these claims. Instead, my aim is to provide a selective and analytic reconstruction 
of the concept of mimetic desire, one which follows Girard's lead in some respects while diverging 
from it in others. Along the way I shall compare the notion to some related ideas in contemporary 
social psychology. I do not assume that my reconstruction of the notion of mimetic desire is 
compatible with all of the rival frameworks in contemporary psychology, but I do believe that it can 
remain neutral in regard to many outstanding issues and debates. For a sophisticated framework 
within which the notion could be developed, see, for example, Alfred R. Mele (1987, 1992) and John 
Heil (1992). What follows is largely a matter of conceptual clarification and analysis. Examples from 
literary fictions are used to illustrate--but not to provide empirical support for--the notion of mimetic 
desire. 
 
1. The mimetic triangle 
 
Girard's basic psychological intuition concerns the role of imitation in human motivation. In a 
deceptively simple phrase, he defines mimetic desire as le desir selon l'Autre--desire according to, 
or following, the Other--where this Other is a mediator who provides a pattern for an agent's desire. 
Mimetic desire is contrasted to desire selon soi, desire according to one's own intrinsic preferences. 
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Mimetic desire is said to be triangular because its elementary structure includes three terms: the 
desiring agent, the object of this agent's desire, and a mediator or model. 
 
Girard declares that 'at the origin of a desire there is always the spectacle of another real or illusory 
desire' (1961, p. 126). For example, in Proust's narrative the young Marcel longs to see la Berma 
perform because he has learned that the writer Bergotte greatly admires this actress. Marcel happens 
to be right about the nature of his mediator's desire, since Swann, as well as Bergotte's book on 
Racine, inform him reliably about the writer's attitudes. But imitators can be wrong about what their 
mediators desire. In Stendhal's Le Rouge et le noir, when M. de Renal wrongly thinks that Valenod 
wants to engage Julien Sorel as a tutor, his own desire to hire the young man is strengthened by the 
imaginary desire he attributes to his rival. Mimetic desire, then, is a desire linked to a belief about 
another-desire. We may refer to the class of beliefs in question here as the mimetic agent's 
'attributions of desire', as it is a matter of the desiring agent attributing a state of desire to a mediator. 
The belief may be inaccurate or accurate, but in either case it is what initiates and orients the mimetic 
agent's own desire. 
 
A number of questions arise in regard to this simple schema, for even if one is easily persuaded that 
there are many examples of the basic triangular configuration that has just been delineated, one still 
wants to know how this sort of motivation works, and what factors typically condition the triangle's 
emergence. The issues can be identified with reference to a schematic example. Suppose we have 
the following situation. An agent, M, has at least four different beliefs, namely, beliefs to the effect 
that: 
(a) Some other agent, B, desires S. 
(b) Some other agent, B, desires S'. 
(c) Some other agent, C, desires S. 
(d) Some other agent, D, desires S''. 
 
(Where S, S', and S" designate significantly different kinds of situations desired by the others.) For 
example, clause (a) refers to Marcel's belief that Bergotte desires to see la Berma perform, while 
clause (b) stands for Marcel's belief that M. de Norpois also wants to see her perform. Clause (c) 
could be filled in by Marcel's belief that Bergotte prefers a particular variety of cognac, and clause 
(d) by the young man's knowledge of his father's love for meteorology. 
 
To say that someone desires something 'according to' a mediator's desire is to claim that one 
particular attribution of desire and one particular concept of a mediator jointly generated the desire. 
So let us also imagine that at a later point in time, the agent M has a mimetic desire for S, and that 
belief (a) was the attribution of desire that played the crucial role in the formation of A's mimetic 
desire for S. My questions about the basic mimetic triangle have to do with why belief (a) was the 
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cognitive item linked to the generation of M's desire for S. We want to know what conditions led M 
to desire S because M believed (a), and not because M believed (c), even though the latter belief 
could also have resulted in a mimetic desire for S. Also, M's mimetic relation to mediator B could 
have contributed to the creation of a situation where M desires S' mimetically. Why did it fail to do 
so? And why didn't M's belief (d) lead M to have a mimetic desire for S"? 
 
The issues just evoked essentially amount to two major questions that may be raised in regard to 
the emergence of any instance of the mimetic triangle: 
 
(Q1) Why does one agent and not another serve as the mediator in a particular episode of mimetic 
desire? 
(Q2) Given that a mimetic agent believes that the mediator has a number of different desires, why 
does one attribution and not another contribute to a particular episode of mimetic desire? 
 
Girard's insistence on the role of the mediator in the formation of desire suggests that he thinks the 
first problem has conceptual priority over the second. It will not do to try to answer (Q1) by 
proposing an answer to (Q2), arguing that a prior selection of the desire to be imitated in turn guides 
the selection of a mediator. That would make every instance of mimetic desire depend on an anterior 
desire, which would sharply diminish the mediator's role. What is more, if the mimetic agent's 
anterior desire were itself mimetic, we would have an explanatory regress, for we would need to 
explain the anterior episode of mimetic desire, which would lead to another instance of the same 
problem. So we turn first to (Q1). 
 
Why one mediator as opposed to another? We cannot explain M's mimetic desire by saying that the 
selection of the mediator was motivated by a desire to have this mediator. The latter desire would 
itself need explaining, and should it be mimetic, we would be faced with another regress, for we 
would then have to explain the selection of the mediator figuring in the latter desire. My solution to 
this problem is to argue that it is some of the agent's beliefs, and not the agent's anterior desires, that 
guide the selection of the mediator, it being understood that a 'selection' does not imply that the 
agent consciously and/or deliberately chooses the mediator. An intentional choice is in fact ruled 
out: the agent does not form an intention to single someone out as the mediator of his or her desires. 
Nor is the effective selection of a mediator generated by some other intentional action. It is a mental 
event, but not a mental deed or action. Nor do I assume that the determination of the mediator is 
always the result of a focal or conscious inferential process. Even so, beliefs about potential 
mediators may figure among the conditions shaping the process that results in the effective 
emergence of a mediator, a selection implicit in the fact that it is a belief about one person and not 
another that functions in the agent's mind to designate someone whose desires are potentially 
worthy of being copied. 
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Does this explanatory strategy lead to a regress? Not if the beliefs in question are not directly derived 
from some prior instance of mimetic desire. The crucial beliefs do have an evaluative dimension, 
and explaining mimetic desire in terms of them makes the mimetic states depend on a prior 
acquisition of evaluative beliefs, which would have to be explained in a broader account of mimetic 
desire's conditions. A proximal explanation can start with the beliefs that guide the selection of a 
mediator and attribution of desire; a distal explanation must in turn explain the acquisition of those 
beliefs. In what follows I focus on the former type of explanation. 
 
2. Tutelary belief 
 
I use the term 'tutelary belief' to refer to the beliefs that inform the selection of mediators and that 
thereby determine which attributions of desire are relevant to the imitator's own motivation. In the 
example introduced above, some of Marcel's beliefs about Bergotte serve to motivate the selection 
of Bergotte as his mediator. Coupled with the recognition of the writer's admiration for the actress, 
this tutelary belief gives rise to Marcel's desire to see her perform. The young Marcel also believes 
that M. de Norpois admires la Berma, but not having the right sort of tutelary beliefs about him, he 
is not disposed to conceive of any burning passions or preferences following his example. Bergotte, 
however, is surrounded by the proper aura of tutelary beliefs in the young Marcel's mind: Marcel 
deems his style and philosophical ideas exquisite, and knows that his works enjoy the esteem of 
many other refined admirers. The inquisitive young man seeks to follow his lead in regard to all 
matters concerning aesthetic discernment and sophistication, and thus is easily carried away by the 
master's evocation of la Bergma's superior talent. Yet Marcel is at the same time indifferent to some 
of Bergotte's other preferences, particularly those that have little or nothing to do with his status as 
a brilliant writer and arbiter of taste. 
 
In terms of the schema evoked above, we can say that if M did not desire the same S mimetically 
'according to' agent C's desire for S, this was because M did not have the requisite tutelary beliefs in 
regard to C. And if M did not desire S' according to B, this was because the tutelary beliefs that M 
held concerning B did not qualify B as a model or mediator in regard to the desire S'. Tutelary beliefs 
single out mediators as well as the kinds of desires in relation to which their attitudes are relevant. 
 
My manner of identifying what is immediately 'upstream' of any particular manifestation of a 
mimetic desire places a great deal of explanatory weight on the tutelary beliefs that orient the 
mimetic agent's selection of the mediator and attributions of desire. Such a strategy can only work 
if the notion of tutelary belief is handled successfully. So far I have provided only a broad, causal 
characterization of tutelary belief, contending that this category of attitudes is identified in terms of 
the role played in the genesis of mimetic desire. This approach is, in my view, essentially the correct 
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strategy to adopt. The particular contents of actual instances of tutelary belief are context-specific. 
In some cases, such words as 'reverence', 'esteem' and 'admiration' would best characterize the 
mimetic agent's attitudes toward the mediator, but in others, notions of purity, efficacity or power 
might be more appropriate. There are simply many different contents involved when people come 
to have a deep confidence in some mediator's superiority, or perhaps more generally, in the kind of 
hierarchical difference that is described by Girard as 'deviated transcendence' (by which he means 
to refer to a kind of displaced religiosity in which human agents sacralize each other). And there are 
many different ways in which such beliefs will be generated, justified and sustained. 
 
It remains possible, however, to explore some schematic formulations of the typical contents of 
tutelary belief. In this regard, Girard's intuitions about mimetic desire may be usefully contrasted to 
the kind of 'thin' tutelary belief emphasized by some contemporary social psychologists. One such 
idea may be schematically conveyed as follows: 
(1) Agent M knows which x is the best (or a superior) instance of kind X. 
The basic idea here is that an agent serves as a model because this agent is held to possess a certain 
type of knowledge, i.e. knowledge about the value of instances of something desirable (see, for 
example, Ross & Fletcher, 1985). A somewhat different formulation that appears in the literature 
runs as follows: 
 
(2) Agent M knows which x will successfully yield some desired result y. 
The idea here is that of an instrumental imitator for whom imitation is a means to some other, pre-
established end (see, for example, Bandura, 1986). Equipped with a set of preferences, the imitative 
agent observes the consequences of others' actions and then copies those agents whose actions result 
in outcomes the agent would find rewarding were he or she in a similar situation. A related tutelary 
schema runs as follows: 
 
(3) Agent M knows in general how to get things done. 
The idea here is that someone may appear to be a singularly efficient agent and thereby emerge as 
the model to follow. 
The notions of imitation just evoked may describe aspects of human motivation, but they do not 
capture the idea of mimetic desire. The utilitarian imitator has certain desires but is uncertain about 
how to satisfy them, and so looks to others for an answer to the problem of ways and means. In 
contrast, the mimetic agent is uncertain about what to desire, but this uncertainty is conjoined with 
a tendency to believe in the qualities of another agent, whose example can provide a solution to the 
problem of choosing ends as well as means. Formula (2) focuses the agent's interest on a particular 
task, not on the mediator's personal qualities, and thus fails to capture the mimetic emphasis on the 
agent's relation to a mediator. Formula (3) stresses the relation to a particular mediator, but 
subordinates this relation to the imitator's instrumental interest. By focusing on the mediator's 
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'know-how', schemata (1)-(3) all differ from the mimetic insight. 
 
One alternative that has been proposed is to adopt a 'metaphysical' understanding of the content of 
tutelary belief: 
 
(4) Agent M has the Being I lack. 
Girard has expressly adopted this formulation in some of his writings, sometimes using 'mimetic 
desire' and 'metaphysical desire' interchangeably. Agents beset by the most egregious forms of 
mimetic mediation have what he calls an 'ontological sickness', their impulse to copy the mediator's 
desires being motivated by the illusion of a more perfect Being. For example, in a recent publication, 
Girard endorses his early emphasis on 'metaphysical' desire: 'Being is what mimetic desire is really 
after' (1991, p. 43). 
 
My objection to this general schema for the content of tutelary belief is that it wrongly turns all 
mimetic agents into existential philosophers. It is hard to believe that human motivation across a 
wide range of sociohistorical contexts is oriented by agents' gnawing concern for some philosophers' 
key metaphysical term. For example, it seems counterintuitive to think that the young Marcel 
believes himself to lack 'Being', and adopts some of Bergotte's values because he thinks this writer 
embodies the ontological difference. Such a characterization of the contents of the young man's 
tutelary belief distances us from a psychology of subjective attitudes. It may very well be the case 
that no general schematic formula can accurately convey the complex, relational nature of the 
content of tutelary beliefs, but it is possible to improve on the metaphysical abstraction of schema 
(4). 
 
Consider another alternative: 
(5) Agent M is (an instance of) the kind of person I would like to be. 
The basic idea here is that the key mimetic attitudes involve a belief in the existence of kinds of 
persons, these kinds being at least implicitly and. partially ranked. Some of these kinds correspond 
to culturally designated roles or types; others are more or less idiosyncratic composites of such types. 
The agent adopts someone else as a mediator because that person is deemed to be a sufficiently 
good--if not the best or the only--instance of a type that the agent already finds desirable. The idea 
that this individual embodies the virtue or distinction required by the kind in question will be 
supported by various sorts of evidence. Thus schema (5) will be extended as follows: 
(5') Agent M is (an instance of) the kind of person I would like to be, because M is q, has r and knows 
s, where q, r and s are typical qualities of the superior kind in question. 
The variables are filled in with whatever people take to be the tangible or other signs of the 
mediator's superiority: high birth, wealth, beauty, manifestations of passion, unique talents or 
exploits, enjoyment of popularity, exceptional discernment or taste, courage, political virtue, 
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suitably transgressive attitudes, etc. 
 
The key assumption made in this formulation is that people have beliefs to the effect that there are 
different kinds of people; they also believe that there are hierarchical differences between these 
kinds. Furthermore, it is assumed that people sometimes do not consider themselves to belong to 
the kind they would like to, and thereby find themselves taking a special interest in those who do. 
In the Proustian example, the young Marcel perceives Bergotte as the exemplary stylist, arbiter of 
taste, and philosopher. This kind of prestige already takes precedence over other types in the young 
man's self-concept. Although he may admire M. de Norpois's diplomatic skills, such an individual 
cannot inspire him the way the famous writer can. 
 
Mimetic desire, then, is essentially a matter of an agent's attitudes toward a mediator whose qualities 
and desires are thought to manifest a relevant hierarchical difference between self and other. The 
specific nature of this difference, however, and the qualities and actions thought to embody it, vary 
from context to context. Consequently, in any particular explanation of the genesis of mimetic desire, 
the schematic formulation of the tutelary belief (5') must be filled in with a description of the actual 
contents of the relevant beliefs and desires. Yet this explanatory task leads to additional problems. 
 
3. That Obscure Object of Desire 
 
In Luis Bunuel's 1976 film, Cet Obscur Objet du Desir, an elderly man narrates his fascination with 
a young woman, who is portrayed in the film's flashback sequences by two strikingly different 
actresses. This unusual bit of casting has the effect of emphasising the elusive and highly subjective 
nature of the 'object' of the man's passion--a rather spirited person who changes radically from one 
situation to the next. Bunuel's film is itself rather obscure, but can be taken as illustrating an 
important point: in describing the semantic content of someone's desire, we must remain faithful to 
the perspective and context of the agent who has this desire. This idea has been emphasized recently 
in philosophical psychology by Fred Dretske (1988), who argues that attitudes of desire share the 
opacity that has long been associated with attitudes of belief. Thus, although we know that Jocasta 
is the mother of Oedipus, the fact that Oedipus desires Jocasta does not warrant us to draw the 
conclusion that Oedipus desires his mother. As soon as he learns that Jocasta is his mother, Oedipus 
no longer desires her in the same way, if he desires her at all. 
 
This point about the semantic content of desire makes a difference when we analyse what it means 
to say that one person conceives of a desire according to another person's desire. Girard frequently 
claims that in cases of triangular or mimetic desire, the two agents desire 'the same thing'. He writes, 
for example, that 'Mediation begets a second desire exactly the same as [parfaitement identique a] 
the mediator's' (1961, p. 21). But a closer look reveals some important ambiguities. 
This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Philosophical Psychology 7:3 (1994); doi: 10.1080/09515089408573125 
ISSN 0951-5089 (Print) / 1465-394X (Online)  
Copyright © 1994 Routledge. Published online: 10 Jun 2008
8 
 
 
The issue can be framed with reference to another schematic example. Imagine that Gilberte is 
disposed to desire mimetically with Odette as her mediator, which means that Gilberte has the right 
sort of tutelary beliefs about Odette. Let us also suppose that these two women are both members 
of a certain committee. Odette has been serving as the head of the committee, but her term is up and 
a new chairperson must be elected. Now, Odette is eligible for a second term, and Gilberte knows 
that Odette would like very much to keep the position. Gilberte's knowledge of Odette's desire 
serves as the mimetic agent's attribution of desire. What, then, is the content of the desire that 
Gilberte acquires mimetically, 'according to' her accurate belief about Odette's desire? 
 
The answer to this question is not as straightforward as one might think, for we can plausibly 
imagine at least two very different objects of Gilberte's mimetic desire. Thus, Gilberte could desire 
the realization of either one of two mutually exclusive situations: 
(S1) Odette is renamed chairperson of the committee. 
(S2) Gilberte becomes chairperson of the committee. 
 
Do we want to say that both (S1) and (S2) correspond to instances of mimetic desire, or only one of 
them? It seems to me that we have to say both if we are not going to restrict the scope of the theory 
very severely. There are some contexts, such as cultural systems having very stable hierarchies, in 
which people's desires are often formed in ways analogous to (S1), in the sense that these people 
imitate a leader's desires in a cooperative and subordinate fashion. There is no good reason why a 
theory of mimetic desire should rule such cases out. Nor is there any good evidence to support the 
idea that in all such cases, a fundamental 'ambivalence' toward the mediator is present, being 
somehow 'repressed' if it does not make itself manifest. In that direction lie psychodynamic 
speculations and a circular positing of unconscious death drives, killer instincts or a metaphysical 
'will to power'. But if my argument is accepted, the much-discussed tendency of mimetic desire to 
generate rivalry all of the time is put in question. I have in mind here, for example, Girard's 
contention that 'mimesis coupled with desire leads automatically to conflict' (1972, p. 205). Given a 
definition that embraces cases of types (S1) and (S2) above, mimetic desire does not necessarily 
generate rivalry or even a potential for it. It is not synonymous with 'emulation' or with a desire to 
surpass the mediator. 
 
What has the potential to generate rivalry is not mimetic desire in general, but a type of mimetic 
desire in which the agent wants to appropriate for his or her own exclusive possession what the 
mediator is thought (or known) to desire in a similar way. This competitive subset of mimetic desires 
can be identified in terms of the type of contents that are involved, namely, those that exclude any 
possible cooperative sharing or harmonious coincidence of the goals implicit in the mediator's and 
the imitator's desires. Gilberte's emulative desire to supplant Odette as chairperson is an example. 
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Desires of this sort are not externally imposed on an agent, but amount to a specific manner of 
imitating a mediator's desire. 
 
There is a lesson here about the puzzling question of the contents of attitudes of desire. Strictly 
speaking, the contents of an agent's mimetic desire and that of the mediator's desire are not 
equivalent, even when the contents of the real mediator's desire are faithfully mapped by the 
mimetic agent's attributions of desire to that person. This is so because the mimetic agent's desire is 
adapted to that agent's own situation and perspective. The actual content of a desire is, so to speak, 
always in the first person. My imitation of your desire for your lunch is not the same as your desire 
for your lunch, even if what I want is not to eat your sandwich, but to see your hunger be satisfied. 
Gilberte's desire to steal Odette's seat may be based on, but is not equivalent to, Odette's desire to 
keep Odette's seat. Nor is Gilberte's desire to help Odette keep Odette's seat equivalent to Odette's 
desire to keep Odette's seat. Only a schematic similarity obtains. 
 
This point makes a difference to the analysis of mimetic relationships. Consider, for example, 
Girard's discussion of what he presents. as a very common mimetic configuration. Two young 
people make no declaration of their mutual love because both feel it would be dangerous to be the 
first to speak. Why? Girard writes: 
 
The desire that speaks first puts itself on display and, as a result, can become a mimetic model for 
the desire that has not yet spoken. The displayed desire runs the risk of being copied rather than 
reciprocated. In order to desire someone who desires us, we must not imitate the offered desire, we 
must reciprocate it, which is vastly different . . . If Benedick spoke first and Beatrice took his desire 
as a model, she might reorient her desire toward herself in imitation of Benedick's desire; she would 
prefer herself to him. (1991, pp. 80-1) 
 
The feared 'copying' of desire to which Girard refers cannot amount to anything like a simple 
equivalence of the two situations desired by Benedick and Beatrice. Should Beatrice hear Benedick 
say 'I love you' and then translate this mimetically into her own internal 'I love myself', her desire 
would be a rather bad copy of his. Girard seems to be reasoning that the anticipated danger resides 
in a 'copying' that in fact amounts to a radical transformation of the content of Benedick's utterance, 
namely, one that extracts from his 'I love you' something like 'I believe you desirable', which, when 
given an egotistical twist, becomes a reaffirmation of Beatrice's vain 'I am desirable and need not 
reciprocate your desire'. If Beatrice has negative attitudes about herself, she might take Benedick's 'I 
love you' as evidence of his lack of good judgement, and hence as a reason for not reciprocating. But 
in neither of the two cases just evoked would it be a matter of a faithful copying or imitation of the 
initial desire--unless, of course, that initial desire were not a desire for reciprocal affection, but 
something egotistical and predatory, such as the desire to make an erotic conquest. But then the 'I 
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love you' was a dishonest and misleading utterance in the first place. Any danger that Beatrice may 
'prefer herself' stands prior, then, to any danger that she may 'copy' or imitate Benedick's declaration. 
Although imitation may exacerbate romantic rivalry, it does not generate it ex nihilo or convert two 
unspoken desires for mutual love into two selfish desires for conquest. The young lovers' hesitation 
is more simply explained by pointing out that they are both uncertain about the other's response 
and are afraid that a declaration will not be reciprocated, which is something they could fear for any 
number of reasons having nothing to do with imitation. 
 
4. Internal and external mediation 
 
Mimetic desire would appear to be a concept that embraces two highly divergent kinds of cases. On 
the one hand, mimetic desire is said to involve an agent's emulative relation to another person, a 
relation that is inherently conflictual: the other person is at once a model and an obstacle, with 
rivalry being a likely result. On the other hand, mimetic desire is said to involve an agent's 
hierarchical relation to another person, a relation that is essentially one of subordination. Is this not 
a matter of seeking to explain two rather different things in terms of the same kind of desire? What 
does the theory of mimetic desire have to say about the difference? 
 
The difference between what may be called the imitative (hierarchical) and emulative (conflictual) 
varieties of mimetic desire should, I think, be linked to two different kinds of tutelary beliefs about 
the mediator. One kind of belief posits a mediator who is not only superior, but whose superiority 
seems unassailable. To desire following such a figure's desire is not to seek to equal or to surpass 
the mediator, but to subordinate one's wishes and efforts to those of the mediator. There are many 
examples of this sort of thing in many different cultural contexts, especially those where religious 
beliefs serve to ground social distinctions in a source believed to be transcendent and extra-social. 
Girard elaborates on this theme in his discussion of Shakespeare's conception of an hierarchical 
order based on 'degree' (1991, pp. 165-6). 
 
The other constellation of tutelary beliefs about the mediator also involves a notion of the mediator's 
superiority or hierarchical difference, but this advantage or difference is not thought to be 
permanent. Instead, it is taken as something to be overcome. The other's perceived difference is a 
spur to motives having the goal of diminishing this difference, or more frequently, of maintaining 
the relation of inequality while reversing the roles. This is the world of envy, superbly illustrated in 
Girard's analysis of the conspirators' mimetic relation to Julius Caesar in Shakespeare's play (1991, 
pp. 85-99). 
 
Girard speaks of the 'distance' between the mediator and the desiring subject, distinguishing 
between 'internal' and 'external' forms of mediation. The latter involves a desiring agent's relation 
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to a mediator whose hierarchical difference is deemed to be permanent and unassailable. The former 
involves an agent's relation to an 'obstacle model' in an emulative type of desire. The distinction has 
nothing to do with the physical presence or absence of the mediator within the desiring agent's 
sphere of existence. The world of internal mediation as Girard describes it is one in which social 
hierarchies and stratifications no longer have the legitimacy and stability they once enjoyed. This is 
a world of acquisitive individualism and 'upward social mobility', a world where equality is held 
forth as the yardstick of justice, while at the same time a perpetual quest for personal distinction is 
the lifetime burden of the 'successful' and 'well-adapted' individual. Thus the difference between 
external and internal forms of mediation corresponds directly to the historical emergence of certain 
notions of equality and to the discovery of the arbitrary and illusory bases of the institutions and 
concepts that once erected stable barriers between classes of agents. 
 
5. Mimetic desire and cognitive constraints 
 
A key term in Girard's discussions of mimetic desire and patterns of interaction is the word 
meconnaissance, which may be translated variously as 'misrepresentation', 'failure to recognize or 
appreciate fully', etc. Girard speaks of mimetic desire leading to false conclusions, to a crucial sort 
of forgetting, and to an inability to recognize certain important facts. In the context of a discussion 
of Freudian theories, he proclaims that the failure to recognize the true nature of mimesis is 'the real 
unconscious [le veritable inconscient]' (1972, p. 260). Are there, then, some cognitive constraints that 
accompany mimetic desire? 
 
In response to this question, Jean-Michel Oughourlian has proposed that all 'romantic' (that is, all 
non-mimetic) psychologies have two blind spots: they do not acknowledge the role played by desire 
in the constitution of the self, and they fail to understand the role that others play in the formation 
of desire (1982, p. 34). In the pathological forms of mimetic desire, this lack of awareness is replaced 
by a deluded affirmation of the individual's ability to desire spontaneously. The latter belief, then, 
would be the typical delusion of the pathological mimetic personality, while a mere absence of 
knowledge of one's own mimetic desire would be a cognitive constraint typical of more normal 
forms of selfhood. This is not, however, either an adequate interpretation or a plausible extension of 
Girard's intuitions. Girard explicitly refers to cases in which agents are not only acutely aware of the 
sway of desire, but understand its mediated nature. The young Swann knows that his desire to see 
la Berma began when he learned of the revered Bergotte's admiration for her. Don Quixote has many 
blind spots, but he consistently and doggedly holds that he cannot find the right path in life without 
referring to his chivalric models. Agents often recognize the nature and role of at least some of their 
own passions, and thus stand as exceptions to Oughourlian's first blind spot. 
 
If types of cognitive constraints are to be correlated with mimetic desire, it is necessary to provide a 
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precise description of the constraints in question. Such descriptions could be based on a number of 
conceptually distinct cognitive items, including at least the following: (1) the mimetic agent's beliefs 
about the objects of his or her own desires; (2) the mimetic agent's beliefs about the provenance 
(mimetic or non-mimetic) of his or her own desires; (3) the mimetic agent's beliefs about the objects 
of the mediator's desires; (4) the mimetic agent's beliefs about the provenance (mimetic or non-
mimetic) of the mediator's desires; (5) the mimetic agent's beliefs about his or her relation to the 
mediator; and (6) the mimetic agent's beliefs about the mediator's beliefs about the mimetic agent 
and their relationship. What is more, in regard to each of these categories of beliefs, the analysis 
should distinguish between cases where the agent (a) holds at least a partially accurate belief, (b) 
holds an inaccurate belief, and (c) holds no belief on the topic. Additional complexities could be 
introduced by including reference to the agent's justification (or absence of justification) for holding 
or failing to hold the beliefs in question--following diverse specifications of the relevant norms of 
epistemic justification. 
 
A theory of the cognitive constraints of mimetic desire could claim, for example, that in all cases of 
internal mediation, the desiring agent's beliefs under category (4) are systematically of type (b), i.e. 
all emulative desirers believe the mediator's desires are non-mimetic, when in fact they are mimetic. 
Yet it is easy to think of plausible counterexamples to such a constraint. General theories along these 
lines may be unlikely to pass any empirical test that is more stringent than selective readings of 
novels biased by a search for 'confirmation'. 
 
Girard does not set forth a universal theory of the cognitive constraints associated with mimetic 
desire, but he does advance some ideas about how particular patterns of mimetic interaction may 
be associated with types of 'meconnaissance. Of special interest in this regard are his discussions of 
'double mediation', that is, cases where two agents take each other reciprocally as mediators of 
mimetic desire in an iterated and personally significant sequence of interaction. Girard discusses 
this pattern of interaction as follows: 
 
The model-disciple relationship precludes by its very nature that sense of equality that would 
permit the disciple to see himself as a possible rival to the model. The disciple's position is like that 
of a worshiper before his god; he imitates the other's desires but is incapable of recognising any 
connection between them and his own desires. In short, the disciple fails to grasp that he can indeed 
enter into competition with his model and even become a menace to him. If this is true for adults, 
how much truer it must be for the child experiencing his first encounter with mimetic desire! (1972, 
p. 242) 
 
Girard's intuition can be illustrated by evoking the kind of scenario he has in mind. Alidor greatly 
admires his older friend Cleandre and tends to follow his lead in various matters. One day he sees 
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him in the company of the lovely Angelique. Imagining that the discerning Cleandre is courting her, 
Alidor emulates the fancier desire and begins to long for Angelique. Unbenownst to Alidor, 
Cleandre had not in fact singled Angelique out as the object of his desire. Cleandre thinks of his 
young friend Alidor as an especially discerning companion, so when he learns that Alidor is 
courting Angelique, he in turn mimetically conceives of a powerful passion for her. The initial steps 
of Cleandre's amorous pursuit of Angelique are from Alidor's perspective but a continuation of a 
romantic quest that had already begun, just as Alidor's efforts to win Angelique are perceived by 
Cleandre as having already arisen from his friend's direct relation to the woman. The two agents' 
desires are in fact interdependent, but neither of them is aware of this fact. 
 
What Girard calls the fundamental error of the disciple is the mimetic agent's inability to see that 
the person taken as mediator in turn imitates the disciple. As a result, the disciple consistently 
misunderstands the mediator's desires and behaviour, a misunderstanding that in turn distorts the 
perception of the rivalry that often arises in such situations. Alidor cannot imagine that Cleandre 
has copied 'his' desire for Angelique, a mistake that is partly explained by the fact that Alidor 
experienced no such desire prior to the moment when he conceived of one following the illusory 
spectacle of Cleandre's romantic advances. The disciple does not think the admirable and self-
assured Cleandre would copy someone else's desires, least of all his own. At the same time, Cleandre 
holds schematically similar beliefs, and thus suffers from the same kind of blind spot with regard to 
Alidor's mimetic relation to him. Alidor's initial error about Cleandre's desire does not have a 
mimetic basis, but their relationship of reciprocal mimesis engenders and sustains two new 
misconceptions: both will go on desiring, unaware of their role in producing each other's passions. 
 
Girard's claim, then, is that in at least some instances of internal mediation, mimetic agents 
misrecognize or have an erroneous belief about the provenance of their mediators' desires. Does he 
also suggest that every mimetic agent is unaware of, or deluded about, the mimetic nature of his or 
her own present desires? It would be inaccurate to make either of these two strong cognitive 
constraints a necessary feature of all episodes of mimetic desire, or even of only those involving 
reciprocal, internal mediation. There is no reason why Alidor must be unaware of the fact that his 
desire for Angelique arose when he first came to believe that Cleandre loved her. 'When I saw that 
Cleandre loved her, so did I' is a proposition he could entertain. Given the right sort of tutelary belief 
and a particular kind of self-concept, the mimetic agent could coherently acknowledge the mimetic 
origin of a desire without this acknowledgement resulting in the desire's demise. But given another 
sort of tutelary belief and a different kind of self-concept, the agent could systematically overlook 
or fail to recognize evidence that would otherwise support the conclusion that his own desire has 
its source in an attribution. Imagine, for example, a Cleandre who thinks of himself as an 
autonomous and self-directed individual, and whose admiration for his mediator/Alidor is muted 
by a sense of their ultimate equality of status and discernment. Although Cleandre actually admires 
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Alidor enough to conceive of a mimetic desire following his example, he does not think of himself 
in such terms and does not experience the desire as having been informed by his beliefs about Alidor. 
The link between the tutelary belief, the attribution, and the onslaught of the mimetic desire is part 
of Cleandre's mind, but there is no direct and inescapable experience of this link, like the sharp pain 
that is evidence of a heavy object having fallen on one's foot. Nor is the link part of some 'radical 
unconscious' that can in principle never be sounded by the agent. Cognitive constraints on a mimetic 
agent's self-knowledge are contingent and relative to particular constellations of belief and 
experiences. 
 
Girard suggests that in situations of reciprocal mediation, the interaction between the two mimetic 
rivals will tend to strengthen each of their desires. Just as Cleandre's false belief about the non-
mimetic nature of Alidor's passion initially gave rise to Cleandre's desire, so will this very desire be 
reinforced by the erroneous idea that Alidor engages in renewed non-mimetic efforts to win 
Angelique's affection. The idea here seems to be that the mimetic agent's estimation of the value of 
a goal varies in direct proportion to the agent's estimation of the strength of the mediator's non-
mimetic desire for the same goal. Alidor initially attributes to Cleandre a certain amount of passion 
for Angelique and in turn experiences a desire for her. When he later perceives that his rival is 
actively engaged in courting the woman, his estimate of the rival's passion increases, which in turn 
strengthens his own mimetic desire. 
 
Such a scenario is indeed possible, but one should be cautious about adopting a simple equation 
linking the motivational strength of a desire to the desiring agent's belief concerning the strength of 
the mediator's desires. Even more tenuous is the putative link between a perception of the rival's 
resistance and the strength of one's own desires. It seems correct to say that some agents are 
disposed to desire more avidly when a rival seems to be putting up a fight, but this disposition does 
not follow simply from the mimetic nature of the agent's initial motivation. We can plausibly 
imagine a Cleandre who mimetically conceives of a desire for Angelique with Alidor as his mediator, 
but whose desire wanes when he finds himself embroiled in a situation of protracted rivalry with a 
friend. Girard sometimes suggests that desiring something mimetically and desiring to compete 
with a rival are fundamentally the same, but they are not. Some of the objects of mimetic desire are 
cooperative and complementary. When our desires do aim at the goal of exclusive possession or 
victory, and thus are in some sense conflictual, it does not follow that they are reducible to a desire 
for conflict. Sometimes people really would prefer to get something without having to compete for 
it. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The focus of this paper has been on the proximal conditions of a species of desire. Little has been 
This is the post-printed version of an article. The final published version is available at Philosophical Psychology 7:3 (1994); doi: 10.1080/09515089408573125 
ISSN 0951-5089 (Print) / 1465-394X (Online)  
Copyright © 1994 Routledge. Published online: 10 Jun 2008
15 
 
said about the specific role of desire in the motivation and orientation of an agent's behaviour and 
action. Girard sometimes seems to work with a very strong, implicit hypothesis to the effect that 
behaviour is largely determined by unconscious desires, all of which are mimetic. Mimetic desire is 
presented as the very mainspring of behaviour and of extensive sociocultural dynamics. It would 
seem more prudent to hold open the possibility that mimetic desire need not be the only 
motivational state, nor the one that is always preponderant. Nor does it seem a good idea to assume 
that mimetic desire determines behaviour in a direct and univocal manner, i.e. in the absence of 
practical deliberation. Even when an agent is effectively motivated by a mimetic desire, the agent's 
choice of a practical means to the realization of the desired end will depend on a complex network 
of background beliefs, which implies that a single mimetic desire could contribute to a range of 
significantly different actions. And desires--even our strongest ones--do not always move us when 
the time for action comes. These points cast in doubt the notion that mimetic desire constitutes a 
'mechanism' that determines action and interaction, if by 'mechanism' is meant a closed system of 
factors that function together to produce certain invariable types of effects. The concepts evoked in 
this paper describe a cluster of motivational factors, but are not meant to provide a comprehensive 
theory of the generation of action and interaction. 
 
The concept of mimetic desire has a basic, intuitive appeal. It seems right to say that people often 
learn preferences from others who have emerged as salient models. Today's noisy public discourses 
of persuasion, prestige and stardom are designed to foster precisely this sort of modelling. Persons 
designated as our superiors invite us to desire what they desire, even when the advertised prestige 
and pleasures are illusory or well out of our reach. Parents, caretakers, friends, lovers, educators and 
others serve as long-term personal mediators whose desires may inspire anything from a specific 
gesture or attitude to an entire way of life. It is hard to imagine a personal history devoid of such 
relationships, and Girard has ably shown that many of our best narratives and dramas 
systematically evoke them. Girard has also identified some patterns that can emerge when mimetic 
relations go wrong. Threatened by the progress of the disciple, the mediator may withhold 
encouragement and begin to compete, thereby vitiating cooperation. In a world that prizes 
individual talent and success, imitation must be disguised, often at the cost of delusion and deceit. 
Runaway systems of mimetic competition mete out bitter rewards of failure and envy. Girard's 
valuable discussions of these phenomena have opened up many avenues of enquiry. 
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